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Abstract: The so-called “crisis of the humanities” can be understood in terms of an 
asymmetry between the natural and social sciences on the one hand and the humanities on 
the other. While the sciences approach topics related to human experience in 
quantificational or experimental terms, the humanities turn to ancient, canonical, and other 
texts in the search for truths about human experience. As each approach has its own unique 
limitations, it is desirable to overcome or remove the asymmetry between them. The 
present article seeks to do just that by advancing and defending the following two claims: 
(a) that humanity is ubiquitous wherever language is used; and (b) that anything that can be 
experienced by humans is in need of an interpretation. Two arguments are presented in 
support of these claims. The first argument concerns the nature of questions, which are one 
of the fundamental marks or manifestations of human language. All questions are 
ultimately attempts to find meanings or interpretations of what is presented. As such, in 
questioning phenomena, one seeks to transcend the negative space or oppression of 
imposed structures; in doing so, one reveals one’s humanity. Second, all phenomena are 
textual in nature: that which astrophysicists find in distant galaxies or which cognitive 
neuroscientists find in the structures of the human brain are no less in need of interpretation 
than the dialogues of Plato or the poems of Homer. Texts are ubiquitous. The implications 
of these two arguments are identified and discussed in this article. In particular, it is argued 
that the ubiquity of humanity and textuality points to a view of human nature that is neither 
individualistic nor collectivist but rather integrational in suggesting that the realization of 
oneself is inseparable from the realization of others. 
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1. Introduction: How to Make Humanities Relevant 
What challenges confront the humanities in the contemporary period? While this question has been 
approached in a variety of ways ([1], pp. 310–11), I would like to characterize the contemporary crisis 
within the humanities in terms of the following two propositions: The first is that almost all academic 
subjects have been, or are in the process of being, transformed from qualitative to quantitative studies 
in light of the success of the natural and social sciences. For example ([2], pp. 47–48), quantum 
physics has shown the properties of chemical elements in minerals in a distant galaxy 
usingspectroscopy. The Hubble space telescope produced a photograph—the Hubble Ultra-Deep 
Field—by digitalizing various analog light phenomena from distant galaxies, revealing that there are 
hundreds of billions of galaxies each of which has over a hundred billion stars and that those stars have 
different sizes, shapes, colors, ages, and elements. Genetic biologists have designed a DNA sequencer to 
read genetic information, to describe the detailed elements of life cells, and to characterize “digital 
files” for all living beings. Furthermore, the digitalization of the information in living organisms 
allows for synthetic genomics and the construction of new living organisms ([3], pp. 46–50). These 
kinds of successes in the natural sciences have pushed the social sciences in the direction of using 
more quantitative methodologies. For example, psychology, which was once regarded as a qualitative 
discipline, has come to rely more heavily on quantitative methods. 
The second proposition that characterizes the contemporary situation is that the humanities cannot 
be approached quantitatively because their proper function is to interpret human experience 
qualitatively. Whereas the natural and social sciences understand and explain phenomena by 
discovering patterns among quantitative descriptions of individual objects or events, the humanities seek 
to provide descriptions of qualitatively different alternatives to present human experience. Literature, 
history, and philosophy exemplify this kind of pursuit. Literature is not a description of actual human 
experience but is rather the imaginative construction of possible worlds or experiences. Similarly, 
history provides interpretations of past events that are dependent on certain values or background 
assumptions. Historical events are unique and quite distinct from the events studied in the social 
sciences, which are seen as belonging to generalizations or laws. Philosophy is not a description of 
constative truth but rather an activity of conceptual analysis and the reconstruction of a more 
reasonable reality. Thus, literature, history, and philosophy are not quantitative endeavors but rather 
constructions of possible worlds that are qualitatively different from present human experience. 
Given these two propositions, the need for, and relevance of, the humanities is called into question, 
for the quantitative sciences can deal with almost all intellectual challenges and qualitative reflections 
are directed solely to the interpretation of literary texts. This is the so-called “crisis of the humanities”, 
which is evident within contemporary universities and other social institutions. This crisis raises many 
questions, including the following two: What can be done about the asymmetry in significance 
between quantitative and qualitative disciplines? And is it possible to overcome the crises of the 
humanities? The present article addresses these questions and aims to offer a solution to the crisis of 
the humanities. My proposal can be summed up with the proposition that humanity and textualities are 
ubiquitous. In what follows, I analyze the concepts of “humanity” and “text” studied within the 
humanities and show how these two notions can be extended. These analyses enable us to welcome the 
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successes of the quantitative understanding of human experiences on the one hand, while ensuring the 
continuing relevance of the humanities and texts on the other. 
2. Ubiquitous Humanity 
2.1. The Ubiquity of Humanity: Asking a Question 
What concept or concepts of “humanity” are the humanities assumed to advance? Dictionary 
definitions of this term refer to all people in the world, feelings of fellowship, kindness, and values to 
promote and safeguard the preservation of human life and dignity. These dictionary definitions are 
helpful to a certain extent, but they can also be challenged in a variety of ways. How do we know that 
the concept of “humanity” really means those things? Can we observe such a thing as humanity? How 
is it that all human beings can agree with those dictionary definitions? What is the mechanism behind 
this marvelous consensus despite the different cultural backgrounds that exist in this world? 
A single hypothesis, I suggest, provides answers to each of the foregoing questions. The hypothesis 
is that human languages reflect how we humans think of ourselves, and all humans who are capable of 
using a language are bound to accept the understanding of humanity which language presupposes.  
In other words, human language is a mirror of humanity1. I will begin the argument for this hypothesis 
by considering the notion of a question2. 
A two-year-old child asks her mother, “What is this?” Her mother answers, “It is a puppy.” The 
child asks, “What is a puppy?” The mother answers her child again, but each response from the mother 
generates a further question from the child. What do the child’s questions show? What is the difference 
of the child before the questions she asks and after the answers she receives? One account of the 
difference is as follows. Before the question, what the child refers to by means of the indexicial term 
“this” may have no meaning and no relation to other terms she uses, but after the question and the 
answer “this” comes to have a relation with other terms and becomes a meaningful object. Though 
what was denoted by “this” before the question and the answer was merely an indefinite x, it becomes 
a concrete object of meaning in the child’s conceptual world after the question and answer. So the child’s 
conceptual system is enriched through the process of questioning and answering, and in this sense the 
child enters into a preferable position in comparison to her original state. 
The child’s question resembles the philosophical tradition in which a question (τί ἐστι) is asked of  
an object or a concept. For example, a number of people can talk about a thing in different ways, but as 
people keep asking the ti esti question, there emerges a concept or a definition of it ([6], pp. 17–19).  
The child is extending her conceptual world by asking questions while not knowing the meaning of 
                                                 
1 The idea that human language is a mirror of humanity is nothing new. When Aristotle said that humans are rational, 
Chomsky that language is innate, and Wittgenstein that humans play a language game, one may see the idea behind 
their remarks. What I try to do here with the idea is to show through an analysis of the notion of question that humans 
are themselves active agents who connect language and humanity; that humans, language, and humans are necessarily 
integrated with each other; and that the presence of one indicates the presence of the other two. 
2 There are various discussions about the notion of a question. For example, G. Stahl proposed that the meaning of a 
question is a set of correct answers ([4], pp. ix–xvii), C. H. Kahn was leaning toward a view that questions are attempts 
to categorize human experiences ([5], pp. 227–78). But I tried here to go further to relate the notion of question both to 
the notions of language and humanity. 
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words like “concept” or “essence”. Questions extend not only speakers’ conceptual worlds but also 
human relationships and solidarity. One can generalize from this claim by saying that any question 
exhibits humanity as human relationality, which is embedded in the very structure of the languages 
that human communities have constructed3. 
“How much is this?” “Would you discount these items?” What does this bargaining over prices 
reveal? On the surface, the bargaining suggests that the buyer and the seller are trying to reach a point 
that is commercially beneficial to each of them. But, on a deeper level, the bargaining may be taken as 
an act of human solidarity based on the structure of the market as well as a shared system of linguistic 
communication. Citizens are both consumers and producers, and there are procedures where wants and 
desires can be met through exchanges of various sorts. Most of the bargaining we engage in manifests 
humanity as human relationality arising out of human communities. Bargaining is a means of 
achieving a mutual benefit, an important element of humanity. 
Concrete questions extend the meanings of terms and realms of freedom. They also exemplify the 
humanity of the questioner. But how are questions related to the character and development of 
communities of language users? Questions generally originate from an intellectual position or attitude 
that refuses to accept all things as they are and instead doubts the relations, meanings, essences or 
properties of things. A dog accepts the world with which it is presented whereas a young child 
investigates his or her surroundings by asking questions. Speakers imagine alternatives when they do 
not accept things as they are given. Questions are acts through which one tries to go beyond what is 
given. Organized systems tend to be autonomous, self-sufficient, and self-preserving, whereas 
questions can be critical of systems or their parts. Tyrannical power wants to preserve systems whereas 
questions seek to transcend systems. 
Freedom is a conceptual space where one experiences the possibility of an alternative to the present 
world. A “given system” may be either natural or artificial. All systems are open to questioning. A 
natural system is one that seeks to understand what is naturally given and to explain the relation 
between humans and the environment. An artificial system, such as a legal or administrative system, 
even when constructed with benevolent intentions, tends to end up oppressing weaker members of a 
society. Questions may be directed with good intentions even toward those benevolent systems in order 
to attend to their inconveniences or oppressive tendencies. Questions are the seeds of greater freedom. 
Questions can be categorized into various branches according to the idea of a division of labor and 
efficiency. When we ask questions about natural and social phenomena so as to give them more 
meaning and to unify them in a new way, we glimpse a wider and freer world than that which we 
embraced before the question. We may grasp our place in the natural and social order. Though human 
beings appear to be atomized individuals, they are in fact born into social worlds with important ties to 
other human beings. Questions raised by the natural and social sciences are not essentially different 
                                                 
3 Sangkyu Shin and Ae-Ryung Kim [7] have raised objections to my attempt to connect the ubiquitous humanity thesis to 
the notion of language use. Kim suggests that the connection may depend on a choice of values stemming from a certain 
usage of language, and Shin observes that the connection would be circular unless the two theses of ubiquitous 
humanity and language use are independently defended. The two criticisms are plausible. However, human beings 
cannot escape from the languages into which they are placed; they are bound to construct the nature of their own 
relationships through linguistic communication. Therefore, their apparent choice of values and the logic of integration 
between humanity and language are interwoven in the natural history of their evolution. 
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from those considered in the humanities in that questions are formulated in systems of languages with 
the purpose of extending the meaning of our world and attaining the conceptual space in which 
humans can be freer. 
2.2. The Notion of Humanity 
The foregoing can be summarized as follows: all concrete questions ultimately shed light on 
humanity because of the way in which questions are related to languages. This provides some 
understanding of questions in general, where notions of reflection, criticism, transcendence, 
possibility, alternatives, and freedom are all interrelated. Thus, I propose the following as a deeper 
definition of humanity: it is the disposition by which one realizes oneself and others into a wholesome4 
being and extends human solidarity and world integration by the means of pursuing better alternatives 
to oppressive systems. Humanity is ubiquitous in the use of language and the integration of human 
activity. It is not something that can be added to language use; it is inherent in all linguistic acts, 
including simple greetings and complex negotiations. 
We may now consider the ontological aspects of humanity. It used to be said that size and weight 
are primary qualities and that color and fragrance are secondary, but then what kind of quality is 
humanity? I think that humanity is a property or a power to seek liberation from the state of 
oppression, boredom, or negativity in general. This is not an eventual property, such as a donation or 
wedding, nor an active property, such as a choice or a kicking. Humanity is a dispositional property 
like kindness; it is also an intellectual property, such as coming to know another person. When we say 
that “Miss Park is humane” we refer to the ways in which her life manifests the value of humanity 
more or less consistently rather than to some particular events5. 
Humanity is also the power of semantic ascent. Let us consider the bargaining process once again. 
When a buyer accepts the information on the price tag of an article she is positive toward the frame of 
the seller. At that point two systems of the buyer and the seller are compatible and the buyer may 
purchase the item without any need to bargain. But when the buyer thinks that the designated price is 
too high, the thought is an act of disagreeing with a part of the frame presented by the seller. Then the 
buyer may seek to negotiate for a better price. When the buyer thinks that the price of an item is too 
high, she removes herself from the seller’s frame. She transcends one system to another. This 
transcendence can also be called “semantic ascent” in the sense that two systems are constructed of 
linguistic meanings and are related in a way that the move has a direction. 
                                                 
4 The expression “wholesome” can be understood under the concept of integration which has been developed by the ideas 
like fitting and integration given in footnotes 4 and 10. For the time being, one sense of the term would be sufficient 
when the term applies to objects of art. The notion of an object of art is itself in need of explanation. One suitable 
definition, which comes from Yunhui Park ([8], pp. 249–59) is that of “a possible unique world”. On this 
characterization, “possible” designates a modality where there is a property of freer space. “Unique” refers to a property 
of construction which is creative, autonomous, and independent. And “world” indicates that an art object is not an 
independent subject but part of a system of objects that require interpretation. 
5 In the present context of the discussion of humanity I limited myself to the boundary of humanity where natural 
languages are accessible. One may extend the discussion to the wider context where humanity may be taken to be seen 
as an ecological property ([9], pp. 163–82). 
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We can generalize from this by saying that human imagination is linguistic and indicative of 
semantic assent. For example, when a father orders his daughter to return home by a certain time and 
the daughter rejects her father’s demands, rule enforcement and rule disobedience come into conflict, 
but the wise daughter translates the language of these two events into two different language systems 
by a semantic ascent, where a system of rule enforcement and a system of rule disobedience can be 
compared. Then, the conceptual distance between the two systems allows father and daughter to reflect 
on, and discuss, what kinds of values are given priority in each system and why. Negotiations over the 
price of goods in a marketplace do not arise merely from differences of opinion about the appropriate 
price for certain goods; they arise from differences between the buyer’s frame of purchasing power and 
the seller’s frame of balance sheets. Generally speaking, people may be in a better position to enter 
into dialogue with others as they come to understand the differences between their systems and those 
of others in terms of idiosyncratic values, presuppositions, rules, and purposes as opposed to the 
objectification of persons and objects6. 
2.3. Intervening Non-Humanity 
There is one serious objection to the thesis of the ubiquity of humanity: How can one defend the 
thesis of ubiquitous humanity in the face of the despotic tyrannies of absolute monarchs and dictators 
past and present? They are not the only ones who are against humanity. People can fall into situations 
in which they act against humanity without any intention to do so, especially when they live in a 
society filled with prejudicial stereotypes. As D. Kahneman ([11], pp. 377–85) points out, people are 
caring when they engage in the slow-thinking of deliberation but are often selfish when engaged in the  
fast-thinking of action and judgement. When people must think quickly, they are predisposed to act 
irrationally and without humanity. In other words, even though I seek to actualize humanity, elements 
of non-humanity deep inside me sometimes rise to the surface. When I engage in fast-thinking I can be 
a victim of egoism, nepotism, lookism, and other forms of prejudice or discrimination. In this  
                                                 
6 Quine’s notion of semantic ascent is used here to shed light on the concept of humanity ([10], pp. 270–76). 
Ontologically factual statements like “there are unicorns in Tasmania” are interpreted as statements such as “there are 
biological species of which the predicate ‘being a unicorn’ is true.” A story of unclear objects is turned into a story of 
clear vocabularies. Quine goes further to say that existence is the value of a bound variable. His goal was to explain the 
unclear notion of existence in terms of the clear grammar of a language. This notion of semantic ascent is useful in the 
context of humanity. For humanity can be grasped as a power to achieve the value of freedom out of a given states of 
affairs. Humans are exposed to intrusion and the dominion of non-humanity. Non-humanity emerges not only in the 
context of violence, oppression, and the objectification of persons, but also in the background deterioration of the global 
environment. Semantic ascent in the context of this non-humanity means an effort to turn the conditions of objectified 
human lives into the conditions of a better order of the grammar of a language. This effort includes among other 
descriptions of those negative human conditions, clarifications of the shared objectives of a community, critical 
evaluations of the present negative predicaments, comparisons among alternative directions, dialogues towards a 
consensus. This effort involves linguistic deliberations and communal communication, elevating a perspective from one 
dimensional physical surroundings to a higher multi-dimensional conceptual levels. Such semantic ascent attempts to 
strengthen human solidarity or to extend our understanding of the worlds around us. The application of semantic ascent 
to the context of humanity may look non-Quinean to some, but it is useful for the purposes of this article. 
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fast-paced age of information-processing, people are easily trapped in inclinations toward  
non-humanity ([2], pp. 42–47). 
How could a proponent of the ubiquitous humanity thesis respond to this challenge concerning the 
ways in which non-humanity interferes with people’s lives? What is the relationship between the two? 
Of course, humanity and non-humanity exhibit opposing values. Humanity exhibits the value of the 
expansion of freedom, which is characterized by words like dream, fly, leap, possibility, liberation, and 
communication, whereas non-humanity displays the value of restricting freedom, which is described 
by terms such as boredom, solitude, silence, impersonality, constraint, and oppression7. Fortunately, in 
the contemporary period there is more space for humanity than non-humanity. This is perhaps because 
the pursuit of humanity is more consistent with the grammar of communication among free and equal 
agents. As the transparent grammar of dialogue has been further implanted in society, humanity has 
evolved to adopt this grammar as its constitutive element. 
3. Ubiquitous Textuality 
3.1. Text and Context 
As we have seen in the foregoing, humanity is typically exhibited in the context of questions and 
answers, but if humanity is ubiquitous it should emerge wherever languages are properly used. For 
example, humanity is demonstrated when I make a promise by saying “Let’s meet next Tuesday”; or 
when pastor proclaims “John and Mary are now husband and wife.” The promise and the proclamation 
in these instances are typical of institutional humanity. These present humanity by the force of human 
institutions. The promise to meet is a catalyst for a sort of human bonding, whatever the purpose of the 
meeting may be, and the wedding proclamation is not a description of a fact but an act of constructing 
a beautiful human bond. In this sense, these are examples of the presentation of humanity. The 
bargaining that takes place in a marketplace, as we have noted, is also a case of institutional humanity. 
My claim that humanity is present wherever language is properly used depends, strictly speaking, on 
the institution of language. But humanity need not to be restricted to verbal languages. Humanity may 
well be non-verbal. 
The hypothesis that humanity can be non-verbal requires a supporting argument. In order to 
understand meaning, one may turn to theories of language use rather than to theories of reference8. 
This may help to shed light on the distinction between text and context, since understanding verbal text 
consists of taking into account various elements of the context in which the remark is made. Ideal 
languages or theories of pure rationalism judge that the semantic properties of propositions can and must 
be determined independently of speakers and contexts. But this perspective is no longer considered 
plausible in contemporary theories of language meaning. In all ordinary languages, especially in 
                                                 
7 As for notions like silence and solitude, I will make a distinction between the positive ones and the negative ones. The 
positive ones are those which enhance human potentialities, being derived from one’s own choice and initiation, 
whereas the negative ones are those which hinder human possibilities, coming from other than one’s own freedom. 
8 The reason why one turns to theories of language use rather than to theories of reference should be obvious. For I 
happen to believe that there is no fact of the matter on which the meaning of an expression can depend on, as  
Kripke ([12], pp. 1–54) has shown. 
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languages such as Korean and Chinese, context plays an important role in the interpretation and 
understanding of the text9. For example, the subject or object of a sentence is easily omitted in context 
in several Asian languages, and there are many homophones in most languages. Yet these facts pose 
no trouble for people communicating in specific contexts since speakers rely on context to fix the 
interpretation of their statements10. 
3.2. Non-Verbal Language 
Let us now consider further the hypothesis that textuality is ubiquitous. Words are not the only 
elements of language; the arts, images, and gestures also comprise a kind of language. Gestures, for 
instance, are the building blocks of body language. They have a communal meaning ([11], pp. 434–39). 
However, body language is restricted in two ways. One is the limitation of variations of bodily 
expressions, and the other is the limitation of communicative objectivity. As an illustration, there is a 
Korean legend in which the hero says to the heroine, “I want to lay a silver (binyeo) hairpin to your 
head.” The meaning of the gesture is not determined solely by his intention but also by the background 
understanding within the speaker’s community. Those who are not familiar with the forms of life of 
this community might take the gesture as an expression of compassion rather than as a request  
for marriage11. 
                                                 
9 There are various notions of context, many of which are slippery. The concept of context my argument relies on is a 
modal notion which was constructed by R. C. Stalnaker ([13], pp. 96–114), where (i) contexts are all the situations 
which speakers recognize during their discourses; (ii) assertions are a kind of proposals to change contexts through 
exchange of information of situations; and (iii) if a world is all the situations there are then if a possible world wi were 
materialized then wi is all the situations given to speakers in that world. 
10 Another example that connects text and context is found in the claim that the meaning of an expression is the way in 
which it is used. The idea of “the way in which an expression is used” can be grasped by the notion of fitting ([14],  
pp. 420–39). The conception of fitting, like those of other value terms, can be thought of as having temporal stages of 
evolution in the following 6 steps: (i) All animals have likes and dislikes. They like what is useful for their survival and 
dislike what is not; (ii) Animals might not have the power of recognition in the initial stages of their evolution. It could 
be that dogs could recognize their masters only after a long process of cognitive development. A dog’s recognition may 
be explained by its capacity to fittingly adjust to contexts rather than a simple theory of truth semantics. In the 
beginning, dogs might not be able to discriminate their masters from others. But as they meet their masters repeatedly 
they come to recognize their masters. Acquaintance might be related with qualities which are useful for their survival. It 
can be said that dogs have come to discriminate what is fitting from what is not; (iii) Human beings construct habits of 
fitting by employing the criterion of fitting which they have learnt through acquaintance with their environments, habits 
fitting for their survival. Habits are not only convenient but also efficient, not only economically but also mechanically; 
(iv) When habits are constructed, the relation of fitting for the habits becomes a value. Habits supervene on the structure 
of likes and dislikes, and typify the structure; (v) When habits are shared by a sufficient number of people, a community 
arises out of the shared values. Some human beings build a community as they are gregarious according to their shared 
values of fitting; (vi) As the form of life in this community includes a communal effort to communicate with each other, 
means for the communication obtains some communal meaning. The notion of fitting provides a basis for the 
hypothesis that texts are ubiquitous, that text and context are continuous, not fundamentally separable. 
11 The notion of gestures as languages may be generalized to the notion of states of affairs as languages ([2], pp. 14–15). 
States of affairs are informative. For example, consider the fact that a magnetic stick attracts iron filings. Physicalism 
would hold that the magnetic stick and the iron filings have merely passive properties whereas dispositionalism would 
assert that they have active powers; they interact with each other to manifest the result of their permeabilities. The 
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Arts too are languages. One can compare verbal languages with paintings or dances [15]. Verbal 
language is a language based on the logic of finitely differentiated and disjointed characters and hence 
can be used as the basis of a reasoning language. On the other hand, the language of painting or of 
dance lacks what a verbal language has but can depict what is felt toward an object by denotation if not 
by representation [16]12. 
3.3. Film Language 
Many films are non-verbal, yet I suggest that films too are languages. So the idea that whatever is 
non-verbal is not a language is crucial to the above thesis. What is a film? Turvey introduces the 
paradox of film by saying that a viewer believes that what she sees does not exist and yet she responds 
to it emotionally. In order to solve the paradox there have been attempts to explain it by appealing to 
notions like recognition, imagination, transparency, and illusion. Allen’s notion of depiction is 
interesting in this context ([18], pp. 76–94; [19], pp. 431–57). When we look at a film, patterns of 
colors are spread out on a screen. However, what we see is not the patterns of colors but what the film 
depicts. What we see in the film is not an object itself, nor an illusion, but rather aspects of objects. 
What we emotionally react to in a film is neither a thought nor our imagination but rather a filmic 
depiction of the denotation of a fiction. Allen’s view of depiction seems to be an adaptation to film of 
the notion of aspectual seeing found in Wittgenstein’s writings ([20], Par. 74, 79). Someone might see 
her own father in the formation of clouds; another might see that her youngest brother resembles her 
mother. When she sees her father she does not see her father himself but rather sees someone who is 
small in height, white haired, or talking in an idiosyncratic way. Aspectual seeing cannot be described 
by a mere enumeration of the physical properties of an object. Aspectual seeing cannot be directly 
represented nor pointed to in terms of physical properties. Aspects can be non-physical, invisible, or 
abstract. Seeing a film is seeing what is depicted in the film as in perceiving what is seen aspectually13. 
A theory of film language can be derived14 from discussions of painting language or the language of 
states of affairs by adding some auxiliary premises. Candidates for such premises include some of the 
observations given by Lev Marnovich15 and Chris Marker, such as “seeing a film depends on film 
                                                                                                                                                                       
properties of the magnetic stick and iron filings and the powers that they have are one and the same; they are organic, 
integrational, and informative. If information is lingual, then so too are states of affairs. 
12 J. Margolis ([17], pp. 376–89) is critical of S. Langer who says that dance is a language. However, Margolis’s 
arguments are not persuasive ([15], pp. 95–99). For he requires that arts are a language only if arts consist of a 
convention of rules and there is a symmetry between the presentational symbolism of arts and emotional symbolism of 
arts, and he thinks that Langer fails to provide the necessary condition, but his notion of arts language is too 
representational to accommodate. 
13 One may relate a filmic seeing with Wittgenstein’s notion of aspectual seeing ([20], pp. 193–214). When we look at a 
particular person in a room, all of us can see propositionally that the person is a man, whereas many of us can see aspectually 
that the person is kind or that the person is not kind. Aspects of an object are neither physical, nor representational. 
14 Sung Yong Kang [21] worries that this sort of language expansion program may hinder language quantification and, 
furthermore, that it may require that we classify all non-truth functional languages as other than normal or ordinary. 
This observation would raise a serious objection if one were to hold a truth-conditional semantics. However, the fitting 
semantics that I endorse grants meanings not only to verbal expressions but also non-verbal expressions. 
15 These are some of the statements Lev Manovich delivered in his lectures in Seoul [22]. 
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writing,” “a film is the joining of cartoon cuts with a story,” and “a film is a collection of photographs 
with a story.” One can add to this the phenomenological perception theory about film ([23], pp. 182–209). 
4. Textuality of Humanities 
4.1. Denotation of Classic Humanity 
Humanity is exemplified in many different ways, but the paradigmatic exemplifications are found in 
the classics. So let us ask “What is a classic?” Webster’s dictionary defines the word “classic” by 
listing three elements, namely, being of the highest quality, having permanent value, and attracting 
enduring interest. The dictionary does not explain how these elements are chosen, but I suggest that 
they are chosen from the perspective of exemplifying humanity. So a work of art, music, or literature is 
called “classic” if and only if it is of the highest quality, has permanent value, and attracts enduring 
interest so far as it exemplifies our humanity. It is in this sense that the three conditions are necessary 
and sufficient for a text to be a classic. 
The dictionary codifies the term in a way that presupposes that human beings live in a single 
conceptual world. While a text may be useful in one culture and not in another, a classic is thought to 
be a classic across all cultures. What this means is that all classics contribute to the formation and 
preservation of humanity. One can say that our humanity is nothing but the result of the construction of 
those classics understood as the tradition of crystalized human experiences. This concept of the 
classics is consistent not only with the present formulation of humanity—that is, a total disposition to 
realize not only oneself but also all others into a wholesome being by extending human solidarity and 
world integration in pursuit of better possibilities against oppressive systems—but also with the 
present stipulation concerning texts, namely, that a text is an exemplification of humanity. 
Suppose that there were no classics in the history of mankind. If so, what kind of human community 
would there be? The human community without classics might not have been the community which 
values notions of reason, justice, freedom, republic, and the like which are marks of humanity and 
which we have known. It is through classics human beings have, over the course of the last several 
millennia, constructed higher and higher levels of humanity. So the initial supposition above is not 
true. Classics have been meaningful and necessary; they are the basis of the culture humans enjoy and 
are still in the process of developing. It is the classics that are responsible for the human community 
that currently exists, a human community with the value of humanity. 
The dictionary definition of “classic” is based on a quantitative approach, which can be examined 
empirically, rather than a qualitative understanding concerned with the content of a concept. So let us 
ask “What are the powerful contents of classics that converge empirically on the foregoing three 
conditions?” I suggest that the classics consist of these four elements: humanity, systems, knowledge, 
and questions. These content conditions are different from the aforementioned empirical conditions in 
that the former are, while the latter are not, distinct from each other and each of them admits of degrees 
ranging from 0 to 1. The three conditions of systems, knowledge, and questions provide neither 
necessary nor sufficient conditions for being a classic. However, the condition of humanity is 
necessary, but not sufficient for a work to be a classic. 
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Let us therefore reconsider the condition of humanity. All the classics involve human lives or a 
human understanding of the world. Some of them deal with human life directly, through stories, others 
do it indirectly with abstract interpretations of human experiences. They all shed light on conditions of 
human existence and thereby enable readers to approach truths about humanity. Readers are sometimes 
excited by the classics and at other times saddened or enraged by them. They reflect on these stories of 
the past and envision lives in the future. Most of the classics are stories of possible, rather than actual, 
worlds, yet they enable people to communicate with each other more personally and more profoundly. 
They extend the world of meaning and freedom. This condition of humanity is the key feature that 
ensures the empirical conditions of the classics converge on the four qualitative conditions mentioned 
above. In other words, the four empirical conditions are indicative of the hypothesis that the classics 
are essentially stories of humanity. 
Some of the classics display the characteristics of systems. Philosophical texts, such as The Critique 
of Pure Reason, histories like Democracy in America, and works of poetry like Four Quartets all have 
the character of systems. They contain their own perspectives by which they interpret the world. Each 
of them has a unique and consistent world view. If a reader accepts its world view, she becomes a 
citizen of that world and experiences the kind of freedom that world view has constructed. But if a 
reader comes to read Naming and Necessity, Ordinary Men, or The End and the Beginning, she would 
have an experience of yet a different world. Those who read many classics come to be open to a 
variety of perspectives about the same discipline or even subject. This kind of reading can be 
contrasted with exclusive or orthodox interpretations of religious canons. Orthodox readings do not 
allow for differences in interpretation. This kind of reading can be given, not only of religious texts, 
but also of other classics. Such a reader tries to preserve the internal rules the classic requires and then 
extends the boundary of that system to apply to other classics, but the best way of reading the classics 
is to respect the authenticity of each unique text. 
Almost all the classics have elements of knowledge. In the philosophical literature, knowledge has 
been understood in terms of justified true belief. One may add to these necessary conditions further 
conditions such as trust, naturalization, or causality ([24], pp. 282–83). The sense of “knowledge” 
associated with the classics may be a loose one, perhaps based on the conception of fitting, rather than 
the truth conditional notion of knowledge. While the latter demands a correlation between the quantity 
of knowledge and the quantity of truths, a looser notion of knowledge may hold that the amount of 
knowledge can be derived from the volume of interpretations ([25], pp. 5–30). When we engage in 
discussions about a subject, many conflicting interpretations allow for a bigger enrichment of 
experiences than just one single interpretation. It is also natural that readers of the classics experience 
many different ways to interpret the world rather than an increased volume of truths. We are often 
moved more by the heated discussions of academic meetings than by the painfully derived result. 
Likewise, reading the classics enriches our experiences of the world because of the possibility of 
multiple interpretations of the world. 
Furthermore, the classics contain the element of questions. It is what brings the classics to life in the 
present. Every classic starts with a question, even if it is not made explicit. If a classic is the telling of a 
story, one can ask why this is a story worth telling, and the contents of a classic generally unleash a 
stream of deeper questions. Readers are moved by a classic and the questions they inspire to address 
the present experience of them, reflecting on their present experiences and looking partially or wholly 
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into the future. These questions reward readers with a sense of joy and excitement, much like the 
excitement a young child experiences when asking questions16. 
4.2. Humanity and Humanities 
I suggested above that humanity is a total disposition to realize not only oneself but also all others 
into a wholesome being by extending human solidarity and world integration in pursuit of better 
possibilities against oppressive systems. But how should one characterize “the humanities”? I propose 
that the humanities are the systematic deliberation of humanity or its results in a chosen discipline. The 
natural and social sciences take various quantitative approaches toward natural and social phenomena, 
whereas the humanities approach actual and possible human experiences qualitatively. As irrational 
numbers are not countable and yet they are real, subjective experiences are not countable and yet they 
are real in the space of human lives. Many problems in human societies can be studied quantitatively, 
but there are other problems that can be approached only qualitatively. Problems like alienation, suicide, 
environmental problems, political entanglements in the Middle East will not be solved in a quantifiable 
way, as through war, but are in need of qualitative solutions, such as those that take place in diplomacy. 
The nature of the humanities can be understood in terms of the theses of the ubiquity of humanity 
and textuality. The humanities, which are based on the present notion of humanity, become holistic 
according to their ubiquitous character. Thus, holistic humanities should be clearly distinguished from 
the traditional humanities, which have been understood institutionally. Institutional humanities 
generally include the disciplines of literature, history, philosophy, linguistics, and religion. When these 
disciplines are organized for administrative purposes within a university, those departments hold their 
own idiosyncratic subjects for professional studies. There are profound reasons to protect and defend 
the division of labor within colleges of humanities. These divisions mark the “divisional humanities”. 
If the thesis of holistic humanities is plausible, the thesis points to what may be called “post-divisional 
humanities,” in addition to divisional humanities. Accordingly, divisional humanities and post-divisional 
humanities are compatible and complementary, both accepting a general formulation of humanities, that 
is, that humanities are systematic studies of possible experiences of humanity going beyond the 
constraints of natural or social phenomena through verbal or non-verbal languages ([29], p. 22). 
Divisional humanities can scrutinize the importance of given disciplines with respect to the future, 
while post-divisional humanities may develop professional capacities to analyze, interpret, and 
communicate with those areas of newly emerging cultures17.  
                                                 
16 One may pay attention to one particular characteristic of my notion of denotation of classic humanity, that is, that my 
notion is pluralistic. But the notion of classic doesn’t have to be in conflict with the notion of canon [26]. Teachers or 
institutions may come to favor a particular list of books or art works, depending on their choice of values or objectives, 
where consistency rules, as they were discussed by Bloom [27] and Searle [28]). Notions of classic and canon play at a 
different level, with classic working across various cultural traditions at a meta-level and with canon pointing to a 
particular direction at an object-level. 
17 Ae-Ryung Kim [7] notes that humanity expressed through verbal texts may have a grammar that is different from the 
grammar of humanity conveyed through non-verbal texts. This is an important reminder. As literature, history, and 
philosophy have different grammars for revealing humanity in their own proper disciplines, it should be accepted that texts 
may contain different grammars according to whether the texts are verbal or not. This issue needs further consideration. 
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4.3. Divisional Humanities and Post-Divisional Humanities 
Ubiquitous humanity can be illustrated in other ways than through verbal texts. Therefore, the 
humanities should pay attention not only to classic verbal texts but also to the exemplifications of 
humanity in non-verbal texts. The fine arts and performing arts provide demonstrations of humanity 
through non-verbal languages. The performing arts break down the boundaries between the canvas and 
non-canvas, western paintings and non-western paintings, work and non-work, and act and result. 
Whereas traditional art work has been regarded as eternal in the sense that it is atemporal, the 
performing arts are necessarily in the present. While art work usually remains even after the artist 
disappears, a performing artist may proclaim “I myself am the work of art”. A physical work of art, 
understood as a concrete universal, is replaced by a personal life with bodily meaning. 
Humanity conveyed through non-verbal texts allows us to see that the traditional distinction 
between theory and practice is no longer necessary. Traditional philosophical theories such as Platonic 
Idealism, Cartesian rationalism, or Kantian transcendentalism have assumed that there is one and only 
one correct interpretation of the world. Furthermore, it has been widely assumed that ordinary 
language is incomplete and unable to develop into an ideal theory. However, the linguistic turn of the 
20th century led philosophers to change the units of thoughts from ideas to sentences, giving systems 
clear criteria by which to be judged, namely, the truth or falsity of sentences. Any sentence originates 
from a particular system and can be judged as true or false according to rules of the system. An 
ordinary language is a form of life for a community and there are various sorts of communities: 
horizontal communities (e.g., natural languages) and vertical communities (e.g., artificial languages). 
Pluralism of both communities and systems is the inevitable result. Theories are regarded as heuristic 
tools to explain a concrete problem at hand. There is more than one system for explaining the world 
fittingly. Theories are systems of partial explanations and ordinary languages are systems for 
understanding holistic experiences. Practices are understood as the actualization of maxims derived 
from a particular theory. Thus, there is a division of labor where scholars investigate theories and 
activists engage in practices. While participation in practice without a theory is blind, studying theories 
without practice is empty. 
But the boundary between theory and practice has been weakened due to semantics. Traditionally, 
language meaning was taken to lie in the space of the relation between an expression and an object. 
The so-called “referential theories” have been influential in explaining the notion of truth. However, 
this tradition has been challenged by claims that there is no fact of the matter to ground the meaning of 
an expression in external things and that meaning is actually rooted in the forms of life of a 
community. The meaning of an expression is the way in which the expression is used by the 
community. Accordingly, the boundary between theory and practice has never been there 
independently of a community and the distinction is merely a convenient fiction. If there is no 
boundary between theory and practice, then one can support non-verbal textualities of humanity while 
still upholding verbal textualities, for the continuity between theory and practice bears continuity 
between the verbal and non-verbal. 
One may rightly ask for a clarification of the relation between divisional humanities and  
post-divisional humanities. Since the classics are the paradigmatic forms of humanity, literature, 
history, philosophy, linguistics, and religion have roles to play as divisional humanities, although they 
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need to be strengthened to meet the needs of the times. The theses of ubiquitous humanity and 
ubiquitous textuality do not limit humanity to verbal texts alone. The ubiquities of humanity and 
textuality direct intellectuals to go beyond the boundaries between divisional humanities and to attend 
to the humanity revealed in non-verbal texts. There is a profound need for post-divisional humanities. 
As such, one can attempt to fuse various topics from each of the divisional humanities into one great 
subject or to construct topics of humanity revealed in non-verbal texts systematically into a unique 
subject. There are various multi-dimensional categories by which one can mix many emerging themes. 
Topics like image, communication, body, death, nature, city, technology, artificial life, mind-extension, 
and trans-humanity can be approached either through divisional humanities or post-divisional humanities. 
The more explanations there are, the brighter the future is for both the humanities as well as humanity18. 
5. Human Solidarity 
5.1. Humanity and Anthropology 
Each of the various types of humanity has its own unique anthropology. The Confucian notion of 
humanity comes from its belief in the edifying powers of education. The ancient Greek view of 
education, with its emphasis on virtue and citizenship within the city-state, offers a different notion of 
humanity. The Renaissance offers yet another notion of humanity based on the use of reason in daily 
life. In the contemporary period, humanity is generally understood in terms of the minimum of what is 
legally and socially required of citizens. 
All of the traditional humanities pursued the question “What is genuine humanity?” but each did so 
according to its own unique anthropology, such as the humanity of the noble man, the humanity of a 
free citizen, the humanity of freedom, or the humanity of minimal duties. What those traditions sought 
can be compared with integrational humanity, that is, the thesis that humanity is a total disposition to 
realize not only oneself but also all others into a wholesome being by extending human solidarity and 
world integration in pursuit of better possibilities against oppressive systems. The nobleman’s 
humanity limited the concept of humanity to social integration whereas the humanity of a free citizen 
excluded others who were not free. The humanity of freedom did not examine its foundation for that 
freedom, while contemporary notions of humanity eschew all of the questions that enlightened people 
are supposed to ask. 
How does integrational humanity supplement the inadequacies of the traditional types of humanity? 
Each of the traditional humanities has attended to some particular aspect of humanity and therefore 
exhibits only partial humanity. The traditional humanities have not exhausted the wholesomeness of 
each anthropology; they are extemporaneous prescriptions suited to the needs of their times. But 
integrational humanity is a wholesome humanity arising out of a universalized anthropology. It was 
                                                 
18 The distinction between divisional and post-divisional humanities is relative to the ways the institutions of colleges of 
humanities are operated. The distinction is arbitrary and needs to be adjusted appropriately to the situation where 
various needs of institutions may arise. We may recognize one general division of labor where traditional humanities 
are engaged in verbal texts and contemporary humanities in non-verbal texts. Institutions called “college” and “center” 
may be allowed to have separate roles to play in this division of labor. 
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previously analyzed19 in terms of the proposition that realizations of myself and of all others are one 
and the same [30]. Then the notion of ubiquitous humanity can be given more clearly, by saying that it 
can be materialized easily when questions are properly asked in languages and answers are well 
provided in societies and thereby when one’s realization is integrated with realizations of all others. This 
integrational anthropology sheds light on some of the debates concerning liberalism and communalism20. 
5.2. Liberalism vs. Communalism 
J. S. Mill presented a unique formulation of what human beings are when he constructed his 
liberalism: the properties of human beings in a society are derived from the laws of human nature and 
whatever can be reduced to those laws [32]. C. Taylor is critical of the idea that human beings are  
self-sufficient independently of society, the idea that is implied by liberalism based on the atomic view 
of human individuals [33]. Mill’s liberalism can be traced back21 to Luther’s notion of the solitary man 
(Der Einzelne) reaching salvation through faith alone (sola fide) [35] and Descartes’ identification of 
the soul with the “I” in “I think therefore I am.” Liberalism can be used to protect the rich, on the 
assumption that ownership of private property is a form of freedom ([36], pp. 209–40), but it can also 
be used to defend the poor by insisting that socio-economic inequalities should be arranged so as to 
benefit the least-advantaged members of society ([37], pp. 5–6, 302). But both of these versions of 
liberalism prioritize the rights of atomic individuals. 
Communalism adopted the Aristotelian perspective that human beings are social animals or political 
beings. Humans may appear to be separate beings but their thoughts, actions, habits, and values are 
embodied in a social setting. Therefore, a community is constructed out of acquaintances, habits, 
shared memories, and space. Moral judgments or political actions on this view are to be judged on the 
                                                 
19 The analysis of the proposition which is expressed by the Chinese sentence 成己成物 can be summed up as follows. This 
anthropology is based on the idea of integration (誠) of The Doctrine of the Mean. The conception of integration consists 
of the following five propositions ([30,31]): (i) The integration of a thing is the property of the thing to realize the 
principles of the thing that are connected with the principles of all others; (ii) “Mind” denotes the power of all things to 
process information; (iii) Integration is the power of minds, not only of human beings, but also of all other things; (iv) If 
evolution reflects the history of the development of the present species then history shows the evolution of the intellects 
of those species and the justice of their forms of life; (v) The integration of a thing is a power to realize itself in the best 
possible way in a given situation. 
20 Ae-Ryung Kim [7] claims that “the integrational anthropology that realizations of oneself and of all others are one and 
the same may be interpreted variously depending on a choice of a topographic map of anthropologies.” What Kim 
means by this is that the theme of power, whether political or not, plays an important role in this context. Of course, the 
category of power needs to be analyzed in terms of concrete human experiences, but it is the priorities that need to be 
emphasized here. Human solidarity can be examined in two distinct senses. The relation of human-bonding is the 
primary sense in which human beings are never to be treated as mere means, whereas the division of labor provides a 
second sense in which it is practically difficult to treat persons as ends in themselves. This is discussed in more detail in 
Section 5.3. 
21 The relation between Mill’s liberalism and Luther’s reformation theology can be seen in the following description: 
“Quite unintentionally, then, the Protestant reformers prepared the way for liberalism. By teaching that salvation comes 
through faith alone, Luther and the other reformers encouraged people to value individual conscience more than the 
preservation of unity and orthodoxy. Moving from individual conscience to individual liberty was still a radical step for 
the time, but it was a step that the early liberals took” ([34], pp. 51, 47–50). 
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basis of the standards of languages which members of a community construct as they interpret the 
worlds they experienced. Otherwise, evaluations would be empty, abstracted from the beliefs, 
practices, and institutions of the community. Rorty spoke of ethnocentrism using the example of how 
the US is bound to act on its interests [38], and Walzer claimed that the caste system in India may be 
justifiable by its own criteria ([39], p. 313). Lee Kuan Yew proclaimed that there is such a thing as 
“Asian values” and suggested a need to construct a Confucian communalism on the basis of the 
regional space, memory, and value ([40], pp. 121–49). 
How should one understand or reconcile the differences between liberalism and communalism? 
Both of them try to embrace individuals and societies, and both try to construct individual and social 
ethics. The terms “liberal communalism” and “communal liberalism” have been used to try to fuse 
these doctrines together, but in terms of their respective ontology and metaphysics, these doctrines are 
quite different. The choice of policies often depends on whether individuals are viewed as either 
atomic or social beings. Many academics avoid choosing between these options, preferring instead to 
be tolerant of both individuals and societies. This sort of stance may be politically safe, but it is 
conceptually unclear. If one strives to take care of the least advantaged members of society starting 
from the premise of atomic individuals, one’s motivation may reflect a genuine human authenticity but 
one’s judgement will not be persuasive. In a similar vein, if one attempts to make room for respect for 
individuals in the context of communalism, which derives from the premise of social humanity, the 
motivation may once again be sincere but the judgment will lack coherence. 
5.3. Human Bonding and the Division of Labor 
Humans are relational beings. Ontological atomists like J. Locke and J. S. Mill admitted that human 
beings are socially related. Many relations among human beings, both in the West and the East, are 
institutionalized. In Korea, the Joseon Dynasty structured the positions of all men in the land and 
thereby defined the relation among human beings, classifying them into aristocrats, professionals, 
common people, and lowly men. In India, the caste system has been applied to all men, differentiating 
Brahman (priests), Kshatriya (aristocrats), Vaisya (merchants), Sudra (ordinary people), and Harijan 
(untouchables). Contemporary societies have overcome such hierarchies, at least formally if not 
perfectly, but have categorized all citizens in a division of labor according to their abilities. Societies 
have classified people in terms of their levels of education and occupations without institutionalizing 
them in terms of a hereditary mechanism. These positions are nevertheless used to determine one’s 
identity and worth. 
Integrational anthropology offers an alternative to this idea that status should be based on 
anthropology. It distinguishes the relation of human solidarity into the relation of human bonding and 
the relations of the division of labor. The relations of the division of labor allow for one’s status to be 
determined by the role one plays in society. These roles are important and need to be respected, but 
they are not the primary relations by which one’s identity is determined, which are the relations of 
human bonding. The relations of human bonding are the relations individuals have to each other in 
virtue of being human. In this primary relation, people are viewed as ends in themselves rather than as 
means to further ends. This is the fundamental basis of the ethical principle that one should not do to 
others what one does not want done to oneself. 
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6. Conclusions: Ubiquities and Humanities 
I have in the foregoing argued that humanity and textuality are ubiquitous. I will conclude by 
commenting on some of the implication of these two theses. First, these two theses may help to 
overcome or narrow the gap between quantitative and qualitative disciplines. The quantitative 
methodologies of the natural and social sciences have achieved great results investigating the 
phenomena of nature and society. However, researchers working in the humanities have limited 
themselves to studying traditional verbal texts—the classics—and have largely ignored non-verbal 
texts. As a result, they have engaged only partially with the full phenomena of humanity. This explains 
the asymmetry in scope and success between the quantitative and qualitative disciplines. The quantitative 
disciplines are continually discovering new fields and expanding the scope of their studies, whereas 
traditional divisional humanities appear to be shrinking. However, the thesis of the ubiquity of 
humanity and textuality enlarges the scope of research for the humanities and helps to construct a  
post-divisional humanities. In doing so it reduces or eliminates the asymmetry between the sciences 
and the humanities. 
Second, these two theses shed light on the extent to which improper relations of humanity have 
skewed human history, for the idea that the relation of human bonding is prior to the relations of the 
division of labor has failed to embed itself in the lives of human beings. When individuals meet and 
greet each other they generally understand their identities and refer to each other in terms of their 
social roles or occupations, a practice that subjugates the relation of the human bond. In effect it is a 
convenient restoration of the caste system which was abolished by contemporary legal systems. A 
person who calls another according to his or her occupational role does not enter into the primary 
relation of the human bond but rather subjugates that relation to that of the division of labor. In order 
to ground the primacy of the relation of the human bond, new kinds of appellations are needed22. 
Finally, the central theses presented in this article may provide guidance on how systems of 
education should be reformed or transformed. In the past, educated people were expected to strive 
toward the three ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty, but education in the contemporary world should 
cultivate an appreciation, not only of verbal texts, but also non-verbal texts, and universities should 
therefore develop programs to achieve that pedagogical goal. On the one hand, Colleges of the 
Humanities should strengthen each of the disciplines within the traditional divisional humanities. On 
the other hand, Centers for the Humanities can institutionalize subjects, topics, or themes of 
contemporary post-divisional humanities, both for the purposes of teaching as well as for research. If 
researchers and educators working with the humanities are not sensitive to these newly emerging 
challenges, commercial sectors of societies may take control of subjects like philosophy for the 
production and consumption of non-verbal texts. It would be much more desirable for those in the 
humanities to help to develop the commercial sectors of society in the area of the non-verbal cultures. 
Just as natural and social sciences have been leading in efforts toward the betterment of the world, the 
                                                 
22 Sung Yong Kang [21] observed that it would be easy to accept the idea that the relation of the human bond is primary, 
although it would be difficult to institutionalize it. Of course, an individual may look powerless, but through 
communication individuals can realize the value of their collective intentionality. Studies of appellations in English and 
French may help in this regard, since acquaintances call each other by their first names, especially between parents and 
children, and between teachers and students. 
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humanities can and should explore the ever-expanding horizon of ubiquitous language and humanity 
so that we may introduce another new age of civilization where all human beings are free and fulfilled. 
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